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ADDRESSING THE CURRENT CRISIS IN
NCAA INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
WHERE IS CONGRESS?
THOMAS J. HORTON, DREW DEGROOT & TYLER CUSTIS*

I. INTRODUCTION
American intercollegiate athletics are in a state of crisis today.1 Our
time-honored and revered traditions of placing academics, amateurism, and fair
play ahead of commercialism and professionalism are under siege.2 As
intercollegiate athletics programs, especially football and basketball, generate
billions of dollars in annual revenues for their academic institutions and the

* The Authors are, respectively, Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, The
University of South Dakota School of Law, and Member of the Advisory Board, American Antitrust
Institute; Director of Compliance, The University of South Dakota Department of Athletics; and
Lecturer, The University of South Dakota Beacom School of Business. The Authors wish to thank
Anthony Sutton and Teresa Carlisle for their assiduous efforts and assistance.
1. See, e.g., Edward H. Grimmett, Comment, NCAA Amateurism and Athletics: A Perfect Marriage
or a Dysfunctional Relationship? –An Antitrust Approach to Student-Athlete Compensation, 30 TOURO
L. REV. 823, 859 (2014) (“Instead of acting in the student-athletes’ best interests, [NCAA] member
institutions have clearly become motivated by economic concerns.”); William E. Kirwan & R. Gerald
Turner, Changing the Game: Athletics Spending in an Academic Context, TRUSTEESHIP MAG.
(Sept./Oct. 2010), http://agb.org/trusteeship/2010/septemberoctober/changing-the-game-athleticsspending-in-an-academic-context (arguing that “rising expenses—and the pursuit of more revenue to
support college sports—have become a destabilizing force for many institutions, regardless of athletic
mission or program size”); Brian C. Mitchell, Show Me the Money: The Growing Financial Crisis in
College Athletics, ACADEME BLOG (June 1, 2015), https://academeblog.org/2015/06/01/show-me-themoney-the-growing-financial-crisis-in-college-athletics/ (questioning whether “most college athletic
programs – as currently constituted – continue to make financial sense”); Bob Wuornos, When
High-Profile Stars Get Paid, Will Real Amateurs Suffer?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/411740/future-other-college-sports-bob-wuornos (discussing
ongoing debates “that could shake the very foundations of Division I (D1) sports” and questioning
whether “the looming professionalization of revenue-generating” sports can be stopped “from
decimating the non-revenue-generating sports, and indeed the very spirit of amateur athletics”).
2. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting the
Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 230–32 (2014) (discussing the long history of
antitrust suits against the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the “increasing[] receptiv[ity
of courts] to the idea that NCAA football and basketball players may be sufficiently involved in
commercial activity to warrant closer inspection of their antitrust claims”).
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entertainment industry,3 the idea that student-athletes should not share more
equally in the economic bonanza is being attacked through a cacophony of
antitrust and employment law cases.4 These cases require the courts to balance
a complex web of competing and often conflicting social, moral, and economic
values, norms, and objectives.5
This Article reviews the historic developments and legal trends that have
led to the current crisis facing intercollegiate athletics. Based on our analysis,
we argue that a continuing fusillade of antitrust challenges is not the best way
to balance the diverse values and objectives at stake.6 Instead, it is time for a
national dialogue, abetted by congressional studies and legislative action, that
leads to a more rational and sensitive balancing of the social, moral, and
economic values and objectives engendered by intercollegiate athletics.
In Part II, we discuss the genesis of the current crisis and review the
precarious balance of conflicting and competing interests facing the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member educational
institutions.
In Part III, we review the historic series of antitrust and employment law
cases involving the NCAA and student-athletes. We note that the courts’
efforts to balance the competing commercial and non-commercial values and
objectives at stake have produced a hodge-podge of confusing and often
conflicting decisions. We additionally discuss the current cutting-edge
antitrust and employment law cases being pursued by student-athletes against
the NCAA and its member institutions.

3. See, e.g., Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete:
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 74 n.11 (2006) (“College sports is a
multi-billion-dollar industry.”).
4. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57
ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 476–77 (2015) (footnote omitted) (citing Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL Free
Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 1991 DUKE L.J. 503, 506–08 (1991); Joseph P. Bauer,
Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace?, 60
TENN. L. REV. 263 (1993); Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans,
Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519 (1997)) (“Courts have played a crucial role
in regulating change in professional sports, and now students are asking courts to play a similar role
in college athletics.”).
5. See, e.g., HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 128–29 (1929)
(discussing “[t]he moral qualities that participation in college athletics is widely supposed to
engender,” and “[t]he impairment of moral stamina” resulting from commercialization and
dishonesty); Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249,
257 (2014) (“Recognition of amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive benefit asks courts to balance
the anticompetitive economic effects of restrictions on student-athletes with the social benefits of
amateurism to college sports.”).
6. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 257–58 (arguing that the antitrust laws are “not equipped or
designed to balance social welfare with economic effects”).
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In Part IV, we address the need for a national dialogue that will lead to a
democratic legislative balancing of the conflicting and competing social, moral,
and economic values and interests implicated by intercollegiate athletics. We
conclude that future expeditious democratic congressional review and
oversight is preferable to the current spate of discordant legal decisions being
generated through balkanized judicial intervention.
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN NCAA INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Intercollegiate athletics today are in a state of crisis. Intercollegiate
athletics’ growing crisis results from the need to balance a precarious mixture
of deeply conflicting and clashing fundamental social, moral, and economic
values. On one side are the core social and moral values of amateurism,
academics, and fair sportsmanship.7 For example, the NCAA Bylaws state:
“Member institutions’ athletics programs are designed to be an integral part of
the educational program. The student-athlete is considered an integral part of
the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional sports.”8 The NCAA Bylaws are designed to
promote and protect “a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”9
On the other side are the economic values of commercialism, revenue
generation, and entertainment.10 “[I]ntercollegiate athletics has become a
dazzlingly commercial activity.”11 Intercollegiate sports today are a huge

7. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121, 134–135 (1984) (White, J., dissenting);
Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004) (quoting 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
art 2.9 (2003)) (“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be
derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should
be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”). In Board of Regents,
Justice White observed that “[t]he NCAA’s member institutions have designed their competitive
athletic programs ‘to be a vital part of the educational system.’” Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 121
(White, J., dissenting) (citing 1982-83 NCAA MANUAL art II, § 2(a) (1982)).
8. 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art 12.01.2 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]; see also
Grimmett, supra note 1, at 828 (“The NCAA established itself as a non-profit organization with
amateurism acting as the foundation.”).
9. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. Justice Stevens went on to note “that the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.” Id.
10. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, Essay, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 21 (2000)
(“Over the past 150 years, the desire to win at virtually any cost, combined with the increases in public
interest in intercollegiate athletics, in a consumer sense, have led inexorably to a highly
commercialized world of intercollegiate athletics.”).
11. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 155; see also Matthew J. Mitten & Stephen F.
Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability
of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 841 (2014) (“[T]he commercialization of college
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entertainment business through which “[a]n enormous cast of participants
harvests a wealth of riches.”12 “Commentators have long derided the stubborn
‘myth of amateurism,’ noting that the NCAA has morphed into a profit-seeking
machine that serves the decidedly professional and economic function of
regulating college sports.”13 Indeed, “it would be fanciful to suggest that
colleges are not concerned about the profitability of their ventures . . . [even
though] other, non-commercial goals play a central role in their sports
programs.”14 Former NCAA Executive Director (from 1951 to 1988) Walter
Byers went so far as to attack the NCAA’s regulation of intercollegiate sports
as “a nationwide money-laundering scheme.”15
However one feels about such allegations and characterizations, it cannot
be denied that intercollegiate sports today are a multi-billion dollar

sports directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society.”).
12. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the
NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496 (2008). The authors observe,
Universities derive enormous revenues and other indirect, but vital, benefits from
successful athletic programs. Corporations that sponsor athletic contests gain
valuable exposure for their products and services. The NCAA supports itself entirely
by revenues generated from selling broadcasting rights of its members’ games.
Many coaches are compensated lavishly for producing successful programs. Media
enterprises generate rich advertising revenues by airing college athletic events.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 75–76); see also
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 75–76, 131 (“A broad array of participants in college
sports harvests a wealth of riches,” and, “College sports is a fabulously profitable commercial
enterprise as well as a lucrative component of the sports-entertainment industry. Athletes generate
great wealth for their university-employers through their skill and effort.”).
13. Feldman, supra note 5, at 250 (footnote omitted) (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note
12, at 496; Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/) (“[Commentator] criticism
has only amplified over the last decade with the birth of billion dollar television deals, expanding
tournament fields, and, of course, conference realignment.”).
14. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 121 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.12 (1979)); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[Intercollegiate sports activities] are all part of the competitive market to attract student-athletes
whose athletic labor can result in many benefits for a college, including economic gain.”); Justin M.
Hannan, Case Comment, Antitrust Law–Seventh Circuit Sees Through Façade, Exposes NCAA
Scholarship Limits to Sherman Antitrust Scrutiny—Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012),
18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 345, 350–57 (2013) (arguing that NCAA student-athletes are
engaged in commercial activities).
15. WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING
COLLEGE ATHLETES 73 (1995). Former NYU Chancellor L. Jay Oliva similarly stated in 1986, “The
university that allows itself to feed off its sports program financially becomes dependent on the
feeding—even addicted, if you will.” L. Jay Oliva, A Challenge to Coaches: Special Opportunities
Must Not Be Wasted, SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 1, 1986, at 32.
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entertainment business. The NCAA’s own revenues during the 2014 fiscal year
totaled nearly $1 billion and included a surplus of nearly $80.5 million.16
According to Forbes, “[t]he NCAA annually produces nearly $11 [b]illion in
revenue from the operation of college sports – more than the estimated league
totals for either the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey
League.”17 College football revenue alone in 2013 topped $3.4 billion,
according to data released by the Department of Education.18 Quite simply,
there can be little doubt that intercollegiate sports have become a “multi-billion
dollar entertainment product[].”19
The NCAA is the organization tasked with overseeing and regulating
intercollegiate sports’ precarious balance of social, moral, and economic
values.
Formed in 1905 in response to a public outcry concerning
abuses in intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA, through its
annual convention, establishes policies and rules governing its
members’ participation in college sports, conducts national
championships, exerts control over some of the economic
aspects of revenue-producing sports, and engages in some
more-or-less commercial activities.20

16. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar.
11, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-20141-billion-revenue/70161386/.
17. Marc Edelman, How NCAA Greed Has Led to a Student-Athlete Uprising, FORBES (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/02/11/how-ncaa-greed-has-led-to-a-studentathlete-uprising/#2010756b4f01. In 2013, “the University of Alabama [alone] reported $143.3 million
in athletic revenues — more than the revenues of each of 30 NHL teams, and 25 of the 30 NBA teams.”
Id.; see also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 823 (footnotes omitted) (citing Pete Thamel, With Big Paydays
at Stake, College Teams Scramble for a Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/ncaafootball/in-conference-realignment-colleges-run-to-paydaylight.html?_r=0; Michael Smith, Collegiate Licensing Explodes in CLC’s 30 Years, SPORTSBUSINESS
J. (June 13, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/06/13/Colleges/CLC-at30.aspx) (“The NCAA and its member institutions generate billions of dollars through television
revenue. Additionally, the NCAA and its licensing affiliate, The College Licensing Company (‘CLC’),
procure large profits through the licensing of the names and images of student-athletes.”).
18. Cork Gaines, College Football Reaches Record $3.4 Billion in Revenue, BUS. INSIDER (Dec.
17, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/college-football-revenue-2014-12.
19. Feldman, supra note 5, at 255 (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 505–20)
(arguing “that the NCAA has become a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar
entertainment products”); see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 496.
20. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Note, Tackling
Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656–57 (1978)). For an excellent
historical review of the factors leading to the founding of the NCAA, see Smith, supra note 10, at 10–
13. See also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 827 (“The NCAA is a non-profit entity that acts as a regulator
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Today, “[t]he NCAA has grown to include some 1,100 member schools,
organized into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III.”21
Unfortunately, commercialization and the attendant problems of colleges
seeking to gain unfair competitive advantages are deeply rooted in the history
of intercollegiate athletics.22 For example, by the late Nineteenth Century,
Harvard’s President, Charles Eliot, became so concerned about the impact of
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics that he “charg[ed] that ‘lofty gate
receipts from college athletics had turned amateur contests into major
commercial spectacles.’”23 “Rising concerns regarding the need to control the
excesses of intercollegiate athletics” led President Theodore Roosevelt to
“call[] for a White House conference to review [intercollegiate] football
rules.”24 A “combined effort on the part of educators and the White House
eventually led to a concerted effort to reform intercollegiate football rules,”
which in turn led to the formation of the NCAA in 1905 (originally known as
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association).25
Since the NCAA’s inception in 1905, member schools have been forced to
“wrestle[] with the same issues that we face today: the extreme pressure to win,
which is compounded by the commercialization of sport, and the need for
regulations and a regulatory body to ensure fairness and safety.”26 As the

of amateur athletics and works closely with its member universities to promote excellence in athletics
as well as academics.”).
21. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit additionally
noted that “Division I schools are those with the largest athletic programs—schools must sponsor at
least fourteen varsity sports teams to qualify for Division I—and they provide the most financial aid
to student athletes. Division I has about 350 members.” Id.
22. For example, the famous Harvard–Yale rowing regatta, which dates back to 1852, was plagued
in its earliest years by Harvard trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage through the use of an
athlete not enrolled as a student at Harvard. See Smith, supra note 10, at 10–11; see also Rodney K.
Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators Punish
Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 1057 (1987) (discussing the 1985 efforts “of the Presidents
Commission and the NCAA to restore academic integrity to intercollegiate athletic programs”).
23. Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with the Reform of Big-Time
Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 567, 570 (1991) (quoting John S. Watterson, Inventing
Modern Football, AM. HERITAGE, Sept.–Oct. 1988, at 105). Smith further notes, “The
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, including the payment of compensation to the best
athletes, was well entrenched by the latter part of the nineteenth century.” Smith, supra note 22, at
989.
24. Smith, supra note 10, at 12 (footnote omitted) (citing GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS
LAW 1 (1986); Smith, supra note 22, at 990).
25. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Smith, supra note 22, at 991; SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24,
at 2).
26. Id. (citing Smith, supra note 23, at 571). Smith adds that “the commercialization and propensity
to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the beginning of organized intercollegiate athletics in
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popularity of intercollegiate athletics in the United States has grown, the NCAA
has found itself trying to successfully balance a series of complex and
conflicting social, moral, and economic goals and objectives. For example, in
1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education issued a
report noting the need to better control the increasing commercialization of
intercollegiate sports through “[a] change of values.”27 The Carnegie Report
called for college presidents to reclaim the integrity and social morality of
college athletics by minimizing their growing commercial and professional
nature.28
Today, nearly nine decades after the Carnegie Report called for a
fundamental change in intercollegiate sports’ values, the NCAA finds itself
again enmeshed in the vortex of a complex clash of values centered around the
issue of fairly compensating student-athletes. As the revenues from
intercollegiate sports, especially football and basketball, have mushroomed, the
calls from student-athletes to share more equally in the financial bonanza have
risen exponentially.29 As noted by Arizona State University Professor Rodney

the United States. The problem of cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the increasing
commercialization of sport, was a matter of concern.” Id. at 11; see also SAVAGE ET AL., supra note
5, at 128–29 (“[O]ur study of the recruiting and subsidizing of college athletes affords much direct
evidence that college athletics can breed, and, in fact, have bred, among athletes, coaches, directors,
and even in some instances among college administrative officers, equivocation and dishonesty, which
actual participation has not removed or prevented.”).
27. Smith, supra note 10, at 13 (quoting Smith, supra note 22, at 991). The Carnegie Foundation’s
report stated, in part,
a change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the commercial and the
material and the vested interests that these forces have created. Commercialism in
college athletics must be diminished and college sports must rise to a point where it
is esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords to mature
youth . . . to exercise at once the body and the mind and to foster habits [of] both
bodily health and . . . high qualities of character . . . .
Smith, supra note 22, at 991 (alterations in original) (quoting GEORGE MASON UNIV. & THE AM.
COUNCIL ON EDUC., ADMINISTRATION OF UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS: INTERNAL CONTROL AND
EXCELLENCE 22 (1986)).
28. See Smith, supra note 10, at 13–14.
29. See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 74.
By creating and fostering the myth that football and men’s basketball players at
Division I universities are something other than employees, the NCAA and its
member institutions obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the
athletes’ talents, time, and energy–that is, their labor–while severely curtailing the
costs associated with such labor.
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K. Smith, “As the role of television and the revenue it brings to intercollegiate
athletics has grown in magnitude, the desire for an increasing share of those
dollars has become intense.”30
Student-athletes’ growing economic demands are butting up against many
university faculty and educators’ fears that a swelling tide of intercollegiate
athletic commercialization may be threatening educational institutions’
academic values.31 In response to such concerns, the NCAA has sought to
introduce and implement processes and procedures designed “to enhance
academic integrity and revitalize the role of faculty and students in overseeing
intercollegiate athletics.”32 For example, the NCAA introduced a certification
process designed to ensure that prospective student-athletes meet minimum
academic standards to compete.33
Another fast-growing set of fundamental social values the NCAA must
balance against its members’ economic interests arises from “Title IX, with its
call for gender equity in intercollegiate athletics.”34 Because women’s sports
programs generally do not produce enough revenue to cover their costs, an
“increase in net expenses has placed significant [economic] pressure on
intercollegiate athletic programs.”35 Such economic and financial pressures
Id. See also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 860 (arguing that “[t]he NCAA and its member institutions
should reward athletes for their accomplishments while maintaining its foundational principles”);
Sherman J. Clark, Response, College Sports and the Antitrust Analysis of Mystique, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. ONLINE 215, 229 (2015) (arguing that allowing student-athletes to sign endorsement deals
“would solve some of the fairness and exploitation problems”).
30. Smith, supra note 10, at 19.
31. See id. at 16–17.
32. Id. at 21 (citing Smith, supra note 22, at 1058).
33. Id. Under this certification process, NCAA schools must conduct in-depth self-studies covering
such areas as “Governance and Rules Compliance, Academic Integrity, Fiscal Integrity, and a
Commitment to Equity. This process helps institutions focus on academic values and related issues.”
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Smith, supra note 23, at 573–74, 576).
An example of an academic report that must be conducted by member institutions is the
Academic Progress Rate (APR). An APR report is a calculation of an institution’s success in retention,
eligibility, and graduation of student-athletes for their individual sports. If institutions fail to submit
an APR report, the individual athletes and team are precluded from competing in any postseason
competition. In addition, schools that do not reach the minimum APR, as set forth by the NCAA, are
also excluded from postseason competition. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, art 14.02.1. The
profound implications of such rules are shown by the punishments administered to the University of
Connecticut 2012 national champion men’s basketball team. The returning NCAA national champions
for the 2011–2012 basketball season did not meet the minimum APR score and were ineligible for
postseason competition for the 2012–2013 basketball season. See Andy Katz, UConn Loses Final
Appeal, CSNBBS, http://cincinnati.csnbbs.com/thread-564615-post-7769517.html#pid7769517 (last
updated Apr. 6, 2012).
34. Smith, supra note 10, at 19–20 (citing Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In
Search of Racial and Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REV. 329, 367 (1996)).
35. Id. at 20. In all fairness, it should be noted that most men’s NCAA sports do not generate
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have led many schools to seek to increase their revenue from such popular
sports as football, basketball, and increasingly, baseball. Further exacerbating
such economic worries are concerns that “most of the revenue producing male
sports are made up predominately of male student-athletes of color.”36 This
raises additional social issues of racial fairness and equity that must be balanced
by the NCAA in setting and implementing its regulatory policies.37
Against this complex backdrop of competing and conflicting values and
issues, the NCAA has sought to protect the long-revered traditions of
amateurism, fairness, and sportsmanship in intercollegiate sports.38
Attempting to maintain NCAA student-athletes’ amateurism, NCAA Bylaw
12.1.2 requires that NCAA student-athletes must initially qualify as amateurs
and then maintain their qualifications throughout the course of their
intercollegiate careers.39 The NCAA’s Bylaws are at the center of the current
enough revenues to cover their costs. See Glenn M. Wong et al., NCAA Division I Athletic Directors:
An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 1, 11 (2015) (noting “that FCS and non-football Division I [athletic] programs are not
intended to be, and likely cannot be, self-sustaining. . . . Instead, FCS and Division I schools without
football rely heavily on allocated revenues from the university and other sources to operate the athletic
department”).
36. Smith, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Smith, supra note 34, at 367).
37. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 370 (2007). Lazaroff observes that
if Congress chose to provide relief only for revenue-generating sports like major
men’s football and basketball (and perhaps women’s basketball), clear conflict with
Title IX would arise. Congress would have to consider and balance the political,
social, and economic costs and benefits of creating any limited exceptions to Title
IX’s rigorous requirements.
Id.
38. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 134–35 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
39. NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 states (with certain express exceptions for men’s ice hockey and skiing)
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition in a particular sport if the individual:
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in
that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics,
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as
permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; . . .
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any
other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based
on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and
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intense debate between legal scholars, academics, business professionals, and
intercollegiate sports fans as to whether NCAA student-athletes playing sports
that generate substantial revenues, such as football and basketball, should
receive compensation and remuneration above and beyond their athletic
scholarships.40 At its heart, the current debate presents profound and complex
conflicts of interests and values that are not easily balanced. For example, how
can the NCAA protect the revered tradition of amateur student intercollegiate
athletics while maximizing the economic revenues of its member institutions?
How can the NCAA emphasize its institutions’ academic goals when the
revenues from sports are needed by the institutions to further those academic
goals? How does promoting a multi-billion dollar entertainment business
comport with such goals as equity, fairness, and opportunity in student
athletics?
It would seem that balancing such complex and competing values would
be a job, at least in the first instance, for democratically elected legislatures
working with experts, rather than the courts.41 Unfortunately, Congress
essentially has sat by and refused to intervene or act, leaving such issues to be
addressed on an ad hoc and balkanized basis by the NCAA and its member
institutions and, increasingly, to the courts in ongoing antitrust and labor and
employment law cases. As discussed below, inconsistent and intellectually
dishonest rule of reason decisions by the courts have created “wildly diverse
and incoherent application of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s student-athlete
restrictions.”42 The result is uncertain and inconsistent rules that do not reflect

regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.8, even if no
pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw
12.2.3.2.1; . . .
(f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional
draft . . . ; or
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent. . . .
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, art 12.1.2.
40. See, e.g., Darren Heitner, National Letter of Indenture: Why College Athletes Are Similar to
Indentured Servants of Colonial Times, FORBES (July 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2012/07/25/national-letter-of-indenture-why-college-athletes-are-similar-to-indentured-servants-of-colonial-times/; Mark Emmert, Paying College Athletes Is a Terrible Idea, WALL STREET J.
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204257504577151212467142838.
41. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need
for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN. ST.
L. REV. PENN STATIM 43, 52–54 (2015) (calling for better economic conjoint analyses in determining
compensation limits for intercollegiate athletes).
42. Feldman, supra note 5, at 258.
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a careful or meaningful balancing of the social, moral, and economic values
and issues facing the NCAA and its member institutions.
III. THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST AND EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE NCAA
The history of antitrust and employment litigation seeking to balance the
NCAA and its member institutions’ conflicting social, moral, and economic
values can be traced to the 1950s, when the NCAA first began seeking to
exercise strong controls over its member institutions and their
student-athletes.43 As “the NCAA’s enforcement capacity increased annually”
in the 1950s and 1960s,44 the NCAA began to find itself in legal disputes and
litigation, seeking to define the limits of its power and authority over its
member institutions and their student-athletes.
A.
1.

Relevant NCAA Antitrust and Employment Law Cases

University of Denver v. Nemeth45

One of the earliest cases addressing the issue of the status and rights of
student-athletes occurred in 1953, after a University of Denver student-athlete
was accidentally injured during a football practice held on the university’s
property.46 The student, Ernest Nemeth, who worked part-time and played
football for the university in exchange for housing and additional
compensation, sought workmen’s compensation arguing that he was an
employee of the university.47 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Colorado
agreed with Mr. Nemeth’s position that he was an employee of the University
of Denver and ruled that the university was obligated to provide compensation
to him for his football injuries.48

43. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 15 (“Thus, in 1951, the NCAA began to exercise more
earnestly the authority which it had been given by its members.”).
44. Id. at 15.
45. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
46. Id. at 424.
47. Id. at 424–25.
48. Id. at 425–30. The Colorado Supreme Court explained,
Higher education in this day is a business, and a big one. . . . A student employed by
the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his education program, is no
different than the employee who is taking no course of instruction so far as the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is concerned.
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The Nemeth decision set off a firestorm of alarms within the NCAA and its
member institutions, which catalyzed them to coin the term “student-athlete”
hoping to emphasize athletes’ status as students, rather than as commercial
employees, and potentially professional athletes.49
The NCAA’s
then-Executive Director Walter Byers explained that the term student-athlete
was crafted to stanch any ideas that NCAA athletes could be considered
professional athletes or employees.50
2. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma51
As televised sports increased in popularity during the 1980s and huge
amounts of money began to pour into the NCAA, the NCAA found its status
as the neutral and non-commercial protector of a revered tradition of amateur
intercollegiate sports open to attack. The seminal 1984 antitrust case of Board
of Regents involved an attack under section 1 of the Sherman Act52 against the
strict limits imposed by the NCAA on the number of football games that could
be televised by its member schools.53 From the outset, the Court wrestled with
the question of how best to characterize the NCAA’s program of
self-regulation.54 Justice White and Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that
“the essentially noneconomic nature of the NCAA’s program of
self-regulation”55 and “[t]he legitimate noneconomic goals of colleges and
universities” should exempt the NCAA’s regulations from the Sherman Act.56
Justice White lauded the schools’ and NCAA’s “noneconomic values like the
promotion of amateurism and fundamental education objectives,”57 and noted
that the NCAA’s “plan foster[ed] the goal of amateurism by spreading revenues
among various schools and reducing the financial incentives toward

Id. at 425–26.
49. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 83–84 (“The NCAA adopted and mandated
the term ‘student-athlete’ purposely to buttress the notion that such individuals should be considered
students rather than employees.”).
50. See BYERS, supra note 15, at 69–70. Mr. Byers explained, “That threat was the dreaded notion
that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees . . . . We [therefore] crafted the term
student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated
substitute for such words as players and athletes.” Id. at 69.
51. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016).
53. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88, 94.
54. See generally id.
55. Id. at 133 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 134.
57. Id.
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professionalism.”58
Unlike the dissenting Justices, the majority started with the premise that
the NCAA’s challenged practices constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.59 Nevertheless, the Court’s majority
decided to analyze the restraints under the rule of reason, as opposed to a per
se analysis, because the case “involve[d] an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”60
On the one hand, the Court praised the NCAA “as the guardian of an important
American tradition”61 and noted that “the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling
college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.”62 On the other hand, the
Court found “that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member
institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA ha[d] restricted
rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”63
The Court, therefore, ruled that the NCAA’s restraints violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act.64
Although the Court ruled that the NCAA and its member institutions were
not exempt from the antitrust laws, it ultimately provided no clear guidance as

58. Id. at 135. Justice White further urged “that associations of nonprofit educational institutions
[should not have to] defend their self-regulatory restraints solely in terms of their competitive impact,
without regard for the legitimate noneconomic values they promote.” Id. It is interesting to note that
Justice White previously was an All-American halfback for the University of Colorado football team,
as well as a member of its baseball and basketball teams. He ultimately went on to play in the NFL
and led the league in rushing in both 1938 and 1940. At one point, he was the NFL’s highest paid
player, earning over $15,000 per year.
59. See id. at 98–100 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 101.
61. Id. at 101 n.23.
62. Id. at 102. The Court’s majority added,
Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college
football. The identification of this “product” with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional
sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league
baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” athletes
must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of
the “product” cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution
adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed.
Id. at 101–02.
63. Id. at 120.
64. Id.
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how best to characterize and balance the NCAA’s conflicting missions and
competing values. The Court left open the long-term issue of how to promote
educational institutions’ revenue-enhancing commercial needs without
overshadowing their social and moral educational missions.65 Unfortunately,
subsequent antitrust and employment law cases involving the NCAA and the
rights of its member institutions and their student-athletes have done little to
resolve this value-laden dilemma or to clear up the ongoing and increasing
confusion surrounding student-athletes’ eligibility and compensation.
3. McCormack v. NCAA66
Since NCAA v. Board of Regents, the courts generally have tried to balance
the conflicting values and objectives of the NCAA and its member institutions
by seeking to characterize NCAA rules, regulations, and enforcement activities
as either commercial or non-commercial in nature.67 For example, just four
years after the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s college football
television restrictions, the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of an antitrust
complaint filed by Southern Methodist University (SMU) football players,
cheerleaders, and alumni “contending that the NCAA violated the antitrust and
civil rights laws by promulgating and enforcing rules restricting the benefits
that may be awarded student athletes.”68 As background, by the mid-1980s,
SMU built its football program from a perennial doormat into a national power.
Following up on reported misconduct, the NCAA began investigating the SMU
program. “The NCAA found that [SMU] had violated its rules[, which]
limit[ed the amount of] compensation [available] . . . to scholarships with
limited financial benefits.”69 Further, it was determined that SMU officials
learned about the payments in the 1980s.70 Due to these findings, the NCAA
cancelled SMU’s 1987 football season.71 Additionally, the NCAA also
imposed harsh penalties on future seasons.72
65. See id. at 102. Justice White cogently noted that each of the NCAA’s “regulations represents
a desirable and legitimate attempt ‘to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the
extent that profit making objectives would overshadow educational objectives.’” Id. at 123 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Kupec v. Atl. Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (M.D.N.C. 1975)).
66. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
67. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 17–28 (2014).
68. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The cancellation of the 1987 season and the additional penalties placed on the program has
now come to be known as the “death penalty.” SMU was the first and only team to receive the death
penalty.
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Pointing to Board of Regents, the Fifth Circuit ruled “that the NCAA’s
eligibility rules [were] reasonable and that the plaintiffs [had] failed to allege
any facts to the contrary.”73 Although the Fifth Circuit sought to dodge the
commercial versus non-commercial debate, it ultimately ruled that the NCAA’s
rules were a reasonable response “in the face of commercializing pressures.”74
4. Subsequent Antitrust Cases
Since the 1980s, the courts have continued to struggle with questions about
how best to characterize the NCAA’s rules, regulations, and enforcement
activities. In a number of instances, the courts have upheld the NCAA’s rules
as non-commercial restraints. For example, in Smith v. NCAA,75 the Third
Circuit rebuffed a prospective athlete’s challenge to an NCAA Bylaw
prohibiting graduate students from participating in NCAA sports at an
institution other than his or her undergraduate alma mater.76 Upholding the
dismissal of plaintiff Renee Smith’s antitrust claim under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the Third Circuit ruled that the NCAA’s Bylaw was not a
commercial restraint.77
Following Smith, a United States district court in New Jersey upheld the
NCAA Clearinghouse process used to determine incoming freshmen’s
eligibility to participate in NCAA intercollegiate athletics.78 The court ruled
that the NCAA’s eligibility rules were not truly commercial in nature.79
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit characterized various NCAA recruiting rules as
“noncommercial restraints” beyond the reach of the Sherman Act in rejecting
a fired University of Kentucky recruiting coordinator and assistant football

73. Id. at 1343. The court noted the NCAA’s arguments that its “eligibility rules ha[d] purely or
primarily noncommercial objectives” and found “some support in the caselaw” for that argument. Id.
The court stated, however, that it need not address the argument because “the NCAA markets college
football as a product distinct from professional football. The eligibility rules create the product and
allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures. The goal of the NCAA is to integrate
athletics with academics. Its requirements reasonably further this goal.” Id. at 1344–45 (citing NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV.
802, 817–18 (1981); Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, supra note 20, at 676).
74. Id. at 1345 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102; Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, supra note
73; Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, supra note 20, at 676).
75. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
76. Id. at 187.
77. Id. The Third Circuit ruled that the Bylaw protected “undergraduates from foregoing
participation in athletic programs . . . to preserve eligibility on a postbaccalaureate basis at another
institution.” Id.
78. Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–66 (D.N.J. 1998).
79. Id. at 497.
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coach’s conspiracy claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act.80 Other courts
followed similar reasoning in rejecting antitrust claims against the NCAA.81
Other courts, however, have found various NCAA activities to be
commercial in nature. For example, just four years before its ruling in Bassett,
the Sixth Circuit ruled that an NCAA restraint limiting the number of
pre-season tournaments NCAA college basketball teams could participate in
was commercial in nature.82
Similarly, in 2012, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “the transactions between
NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature,
and therefore take place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman
Act.”83 It is important to note, however, that the Seventh Circuit ultimately
affirmed the district court’s holding on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to
allege sufficient facts to support the potential finding of a legally cognizable
relevant antitrust market.84
In determining whether NCAA student-athletes participate in a commercial
market, a few courts have been receptive to such reasoning. For example, a
United States district court in Washington rejected a motion to dismiss an
antitrust case in 2005, challenging the number of grant-in-aid football
scholarships that NCAA schools could award.85 The court found that the

80. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2008).
81. See, e.g., Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (upholding NCAA recruiting regulations as noncommercial in nature under the Sherman Act);
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. SA CV 99-663-GLT(EEx), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18618, at *7 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a Pac-10
conference rule mandating that any student-athlete who transferred from one Pac-10 school to another
would lose two years of eligibility, as a noncommercial restraint); Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 1275, 1280, 1286–87 (D. Kan. 1999) (rejecting the challenge of an NCAA rule limiting the
size of manufacturers’ trademarks on NCAA schools’ equipment and uniforms as a noncommercial
rule designed “to preserve the integrity of college athletics and to avoid the commercial exploitation
of student athletes”); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (upholding
challenged rules as having the noncommercial purpose of “prevent[ing] commercializing influences
from destroying the unique ‘product’ of NCAA college football”).
82. Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). The
Sixth Circuit ruled that the NCAA’s restriction “ha[d] some commercial impact insofar as it regulates
games that constitute sources of revenue for both the member schools and the Promoters.” Id.
83. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing White v. NCAA, CV 06-999-RGK
(MANx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006)). The Seventh Circuit
went on, however, to state that the Supreme Court’s Rule of Reason analysis in Board of Regents
implied that most NCAA regulations would constitute “a ‘justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur athletic teams,’ and are therefore procompetitive.” Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
84. Id. at 345.
85. In re NCAA I–A Walk–On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
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NCAA’s limitation on the number of athletic scholarships an NCAA institution
could offer in various sports might be related to commercial cost-cutting
interests, rather than competitive balance concerns.86 A United States district
court in California reached a similar ruling in a class action alleging that NCAA
regulations capping the amount of financial aid a student-athlete could receive
was an unlawful agreement in restraint of trade.87 Some commentators argue
that the court’s ruling “could be read to imply that the competition between
colleges and universities for student-athletes [is] sufficiently ‘commercial’
conduct for antitrust review.”88
5. Non-Antitrust Challenges
In addition to antitrust challenges, aggrieved plaintiffs have sought to
pursue other avenues of redress against the NCAA. For example, former
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian
sued the NCAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights after the NCAA imposed various sanctions on UNLV’s
basketball program, and requested that it show cause why additional penalties
should be imposed if UNLV failed to suspend Tarkanian.89 Overruling the
Nevada courts’ rulings in Coach Tarkanian’s favor, the Supreme Court found
the NCAA’s actions to be private conduct and, therefore, not subject to a
state-action challenge.90
B.

Recent Antitrust Cases Involving the Compensation and
Remuneration of NCAA Student-Athletes

The debate about whether student-athletes are effectively employees
entitled to compensation and remuneration above and beyond their scholarship
packages has dogged the NCAA for decades.91 Recently, high profile antitrust
litigation has thrust the debate into an intense public spotlight. In O’Bannon v.

86. Id. at 1146–47.
87. White, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *4.
88. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 67, at 25; see also Ray Yasser, The Case for
Reviving the Four-Year Deal, 86 TUL. L. REV. 987, 988 (2012) (arguing that the NCAA’s rule
mandating that athletic scholarships be offered on a one-year renewable basis may violate the Sherman
Act by limiting competition for student-athletes through offers of longer guaranteed scholarships).
89. See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
90. Id. at 191 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
91. See discussion supra Section I; SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 225 (noting that in 1929,
“notwithstanding many statements to the contrary, the colleges and universities of the United States
are confronted with acute problems of recruiting and subsidizing, especially with respect to
intercollegiate football”).
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NCAA,92 the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part United
States District Judge Claudia Wilken’s judgment in an antitrust bench trial
challenging the NCAA’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from being paid for
the use of their names, images, and likenesses.93 The district court held that
the NCAA’s amateurism rules were an unlawful restraint of trade in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.94 The district court ordered that NCAA
student-athletes were entitled to receive Name-Image-Likeness (NIL)
payments of “up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation, to be held in
trust . . . until after they le[ft] college.”95
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that the NCAA’s
existing compensation rules violate section 1 of the Sherman Act “and its
injunction requiring the NCAA to permit schools to provide compensation up
to the full cost of attendance.”96 However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the
district court clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative to allow students to
receive NIL cash payments untethered to their education expenses.”97 The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment and permanent
injunction insofar as they require[d] the NCAA to allow its member schools to
pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation.”98
Instead, the court ruled that “[t]he Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA
permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their
student-athletes. It does not require more.”99
The Ninth Circuit’s O’Bannon decision seems to raise more questions than
it answers. As with so many earlier court decisions involving the NCAA, the
court struggled with how to balance and weigh the NCAA’s social and moral
values of amateurism and academics against its clear economic and commercial
values and objectives. Ultimately, the court admitted that it could not draw the
line as to where amateurism in athletics ends and professionalism begins.100

92. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
93. Id. at 1053. By way of disclosure, Author Horton was a signatory to the Brief of Antitrust
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) (No. 09-cv-03329).
94. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1075–76. The court “reaffirm[ed] that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny
and must be tested in the crucible of the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 1079. The court found that “the
NCAA’s rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in
support of the college sports market.” Id.
97. Id. at 1076.
98. Id. at 1079.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1079.
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Consequently, it resorted to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Board of
Regents that courts “must afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend
college athletics.”101 With billions of dollars at stake, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision is unlikely to deter future NIL and compensation antitrust lawsuits
against the NCAA.102
Meanwhile, a current class action before Judge Claudia Wilken, the same
district judge who decided the O’Bannon case, “seeks a free market for college
football and men’s basketball players to be paid.”103 The current Jenkins class
action directly attacks the NCAA’s eligibility rules.104 The plaintiffs claim that
the NCAA and its Power Conferences have created a cartel by placing a ceiling
on the compensation that may be paid to men’s basketball and football
players.105 They additionally allege that by disallowing member institutions to
compete for the services of basketball and football players, the NCAA and the
five Power Conferences violated antitrust laws.106 The plaintiffs believe that
the NCAA’s “restrictions are pernicious, a blatant violation of the antitrust
laws, have no legitimate pro-competitive justification, and should now be
struck down and enjoined.”107
Essentially, the Jenkins plaintiffs claim that under the Sherman Act,
student-athletes should be afforded the opportunity to render their services to
the highest bidder. Practically and pragmatically speaking, a decision for
plaintiffs would professionalize college athletics. What would such a result
mean for the revered tradition of academics and amateurism in intercollegiate
sports?
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Jenkins claims and the Ninth
Circuit’s O’Bannon decision, it seems clear that we will witness more and more

101. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
102. See, e.g., Michael T. Jones, Real Accountability: The NCAA Can No Longer Evade Antitrust
Liability Through Amateurism After O’Bannon v. NCAA, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 79, 90
(2015) (arguing that “other courts should follow the example of O’Bannon’s analysis of the legal
merits and economic implications of the NCAA’s amateurism policies, and continue to trend away
from blind deference to the NCAA”).
103. Benjamin A. Tulis & Gregg E. Clifton, Ninth Circuit Holds NCAA Subject to Antitrust
Scrutiny, but Vacates Injunction Allowing up to $5,000 per Year Deferred Compensation to College
Athletes, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-holdsncaa-subject-to-antitrust-scrutiny-vacates-injunction-allowing.
104. See Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14CV01678, 2014 WL 1008526 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014).
105. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. The plaintiffs include one current student-athlete, Martin Jenkins, and three former
student-athletes: Johnathan Moore, Kevin Perry, and William Tyndall. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 21. The
defendants include the NCAA, the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big 12 Conference, the Big Ten
Conference, the Pac-12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference. Id. ¶¶ 23–25.
106. Id. ¶ 42.
107. Id. ¶ 1.
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antitrust litigation against the NCAA in coming years. Is more antitrust
litigation really the best way to balance the competing and conflicting values
and objectives of NCAA educational institutions and their intercollegiate
athletic programs, not to mention the rights of NCAA student-athletes?
C.

Potential Conclusions from Prior and Current Antitrust and Employment
Cases Against the NCAA

It is difficult to draw clear meaningful conclusions from the cacophony of
balkanized judicial decisions involving the NCAA, much less predict how
future cases will be decided. A recent study of forty-six student-athlete legal
challenges against the NCAA between 1973 and 2014 revealed a steady and
even flow of cases over the past forty-one years.108 The heavy majority of the
“cases involved men’s sports (89%), particularly football and basketball.”109
“Overall, courts ruled 82 times, with the NCAA winning 60% of the rulings.
Students completely won in 29% of decisions, and partly won in the remaining
11% of decisions.”110 It seems safe to say that the courts generally have bent
over backwards to afford the NCAA maximum freedom and discretion in
promulgating and enforcing rules relating to its member institutions and their
student-athletes’ conduct and rights. It also seems safe to predict, despite the
recent O’Bannon decision, that the courts will continue seeking in future cases
to allow the NCAA to protect intercollegiate athletics’ revered history and
tradition of amateurism, sportsmanship, and fair competition.
We believe that the NCAA plays an invaluable role in protecting the social
and moral values and objectives typified in intercollegiate athletics. We
additionally believe that the NCAA must be afforded wide discretion and
latitude in working with its member educational institutions to promote and
enhance such values and goals. But we wonder whether the economics rhetoric
of current American antitrust jurisprudence really allows for the most
meaningful and socially beneficial discussion and balancing of the conflicting
social, moral, and economic values and goals implicated by NCAA
intercollegiate athletics.111

108. LeRoy, supra note 4, at 482.
109. Id. (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 483.
111. See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 39–40 (2d ed. 2008); Mitten & Ross, supra note 11, at 876
(“The current structure of self-interested internal governance by the NCAA’s member universities,
combined with external micro-regulation by means of antitrust and contract law litigation on a
case-by-case basis, is not the most effective way to achieve [the NCAA’s myriad of] objective[s].”).
See generally Peter C. Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A
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As an example, one of the foremost goals of intercollegiate athletics is
competitive fairness. Yet, “[s]teady and unremitting efforts since the 1970s by
neoclassical economic theorists to excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon
have been wildly successful.”112 Indeed, in a non-sports antitrust case, Seventh
Circuit jurist and former academic Frank Easterbrook asked: “Who says that
competition is supposed to be fair . . . ?”113 Furthermore, many esteemed
antitrust scholars argue that antitrust should not be used to address social or
moral issues.114 Given antitrust’s distaste for the moral implications of conduct,
can we meaningfully and fairly balance the NCAA’s laudable social and moral
goals by resorting to an antitrust system seemingly focused on maximizing
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency?115

[Re]conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL.
349 (2000). For example, some authors observe,
Although . . . courts sometimes have articulated non-economic goals for U.S.
antitrust law, their reliance on such goals as a source of useful guidance for deciding
particular cases has consistently waned since the early 1970s. Non-economic goals
frequently conflict with economic aims, provide too little guidance for antitrust
decision makers, and arguably are ill-suited to decision-making processes that rely
on adjudication and the adversary system.
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 111. Indeed, competition officials during the Bush administration urged that
the “promotion of consumer welfare and the organization of free market economy are the only goals
of [the] antitrust laws . . . with other economic and social objectives better pursued by other instruments.” UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE
OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL
MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 31 (May 2007), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.
112. Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 823, 863 (2013); see also ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 145–46 (1989) (discussing efforts of “some jurists and scholars . . .
to excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon”).
113. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in
part).
114. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 10,
54 (2005) (stating that antitrust is not concerned with the moral implications of conduct—only the
economic implications); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 49, 105 (2007) (“It has been a long time since anyone has thought about antitrust in
explicitly moral terms . . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J.
CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) (“[A]ntitrust has no moral content . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking,
judicial and academic, in the antitrust field”); see also Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2363 (2014) (citing
Ken Belson, What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for Colleges and Players, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014),
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“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently rejected social welfare
justifications in antitrust analys[e]s.”116 As a result, the courts too often
resorted to the disingenuous and intellectually dishonest legal fiction that
NCAA rules and regulations can be meaningfully evaluated based on whether
they are primarily commercial or non-commercial in their purpose and effect.
Consequently, complex intercollegiate athletics cases calling for a delicate
balancing of social, moral, and economic values and objectives have instead
been pigeon-holed into commercial and non-commercial analyses that pretend
to be economically based but really involve social issues crying out for a
democratic dialogue and legislative action.
As seen above, the courts repeatedly employed the legal fiction that the
NCAA’s rules or regulations are non-commercial to uphold NCAA decisions
and actions. Yet, the idea that any rule or regulation that the NCAA
promulgates and enforces ultimately does not have some commercial impact
on intercollegiate sports is simply absurd. When rules and regulations
impacting the generation and allocation of billions of dollars annually are at
stake, economic and commercial values are implicated. Pretending that the
NCAA is not “a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar
entertainment products”117 serves no rational or societally beneficial purposes.
Refreshingly, the Seventh Circuit seemed to recognize as much in Agnew.118
A continuing cacophony of conflicting intercollegiate athletics antitrust
and employment law decisions is not the way to rationally and coherently
balance the complex and conflicting economic and non-economic values,
objectives, and goals surrounding NCAA sports. What is really needed is a
national discussion.
The Supreme Court long has recognized that economic regulations seeking
to implement the types of social and moral values and benefits that the NCAA
espouses are “properly addressed to Congress.”119 With the future of amateur
intercollegiate athletics at stake, it is time for the courts to step aside and
Congress to step in.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/what-the-obannon-ruling-means-for-colleges-and-players.html?_r=0) (criticizing the O’Bannon district court’s decision because “antitrust jurisprudence is
not supposed to be about creating compromises donned in social policy. It is supposed to protect
consumers and free markets.”).
116. Feldman, supra note 5, at 253–54.
117. Id. at 254–55.
118. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012).
119. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
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IV. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
It is beyond dispute that the United States has a long and revered history
and tradition of encouraging and supporting intercollegiate athletics and the
social and moral values they buttress. Numerous tangible and intangible
benefits are bestowed upon student-athletes thanks to the NCAA and its
regulations.
Many major college football and college basketball
student-athletes receive scholarships that cover their tuition, room, board, and
textbooks. Other benefits include stipends when traveling to pay for meals and
entertainment, free admission for family and friends to sporting events,
clothing and equipment, insurance and medical care, paid travel expenses,
personalized training, personalized nutrition plans, and first rate coaching and
instruction. The funds that pay for these benefits come from the revenues
generated by the NCAA, its members’ athletic conferences, and the individual
educational institutions.
Most importantly, student-athletes receive the benefit of a free college
education. Martin Luther King Jr. once said: “Intelligence plus character—that
is the goal of true education.”120 While academics provide student-athletes and
students alike with an education, athletics further build the characters of
student-athletes while promoting such values as discipline, self-confidence,
accountability, and teamwork. It is, therefore, critical that we find ways to
encourage and protect the social and moral values of intercollegiate activities.
With so much at stake, we must ask: “Where is Congress?” In her district
court decision in O’Bannon, District Court Judge Wilken cogently observed,
It is likely that the challenged restraints, as well as other
perceived inequities in college athletics and higher education
generally, could be better addressed as a policy matter by
reforms other than those available as a remedy for the antitrust
violation found here. Such reforms and remedies could be
undertaken by the NCAA, its member schools and
conferences, or Congress.121
Fortunately, several members of Congress have begun paying close
attention to the current turmoil surrounding the NCAA and have begun
considering possible legislative action.122

120. MARTIN LUTHER KING III, THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 27 (2d ed. 1987).
121. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d, 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
122. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz, More Eyes in Congress Looking at NCAA, USA TODAY (May
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A. Possible Antitrust Exemptions for the NCAA
Following the brief NCAA regulation known as the Sanity Code, the
NCAA regulations of the 1950s allowed institutions to entice student athletes
with scholarships.123 In 1951, while talking about the scholarship model’s
potential antitrust issues, NCAA attorney Philip R. Hochberg observed: “The
NCAA . . . passed up the opportunity to apply for an [antitrust] exemption of
its own, believing that it didn't need one because of its ties to higher
education.”124 Mr. Hochberg probably wishes that the NCAA had pushed for
an exemption, because the landscape of college athletics looks very different
today than it did in the 1950s.
In the current heightened state of commercialized intercollegiate athletics,
some commentators call for a broad NCAA antitrust exemption.125 For
example, Professor Brian Porto advocates for the College Sports Legal Reform
Act, which would grant the NCAA a broad antitrust exemption “as long as at
least one principal purpose of any such action is educational.”126 The proposed
broad antitrust exemptions would give the NCAA the ability to make sweeping
changes to intercollegiate athletics. Len Elmore, who has a long history in both
college and professional sports, similarly advocates for a broad NCAA antitrust
exemption.127 Mr. Elmore contends: “The National Collegiate Athletic
Association has the potential to be a central and powerful regulatory body that
can offer real reform, but antitrust restrictions prevent it from regulating all
aspects of intercollegiate sports.”128 As an example, Mr. Elmore argues that
without the limits placed on it by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents, the
NCAA would have the power to distribute revenue into a university’s general

20, 2014), Westlaw 2014 WLNR 13469908. The article notes that congressmen such as Elijah
Cummings (D. Md.) and Tony Cardenas (D. Cal.) have sought to put pressure on the NCAA on
growing issues such as academic fraud and head injuries. Id.
123. Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 333. The Sanity Code restricted scholarships to the “normal
channels” that all students had to pursue. Id. (quoting ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 47 (1992)). Additionally,
scholarships could not be based on athletic ability. Id. (citing FLEISHER ET AL., supra).
124. Welch Suggs, Football, Television, and the Supreme Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9,
2004), http://chronicle.com/article/Football-Televisionthe/2342.
125. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 2, at 238–46, 248 (discussing the calls for an antitrust
exemption for the NCAA but concluding that “application of Sherman Act principles by the courts is
a better alternative than blanket immunity”).
126. See BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS
COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 188 (4th ed. 2015).
127. See Len Elmore, Exempt the NCAA from Antitrust, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Exempt-the-NCAA-From-Antitrust/130073/.
128. Id.
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funds and not directly back into athletic departments.129
Fortunately, a broad antitrust exemption, and a consequentially all
powerful central NCAA, is not the only option.130 For example, a narrow
antitrust exemption might grant the NCAA the ability to make competitive
reforms in certain areas subject to congressional oversight. In an effort to
control the costs associated with college sports, some scholars and educators
advocate for a partial antitrust exemption focused on salaries and athletic
budgets.131 Such an exemption could allow the NCAA to set caps on coaches
and administrators’ compensation, as well as team expenses without granting
it a blanket antitrust immunity.132
B.

Other Possible Congressional Regulation

Rather than granting the NCAA more power, some believe that Congress
needs to more heavily regulate intercollegiate athletics.133 For example,
Representatives Charlie Dent (R. Pa.) and Joyce Beatty (D. Oh.) introduced the
National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act on June 11, 2015.134
Representatives Dent’s and Beatty’s bill seeks to amend the Higher Education
Act of 1965 to include concussion testing, irrevocable four-year scholarships,

129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 2, at 247–48 (arguing that “granting a blanket antitrust e
xemption to the NCAA, without the farmer watching the henhouse, would be the equivalent of leaving
the fox free to devour its prey”); Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 370 (arguing that an antitrust exemption
“would also perpetuate the inequities that run rampant in the current system and make legal
significantly anticompetitive conduct”).
131. See, e.g., Jake New, Presidential Panel on College Sports?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 13,
2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/13/ncaa-discuss-federal-oversight-collegeathletics-white-house.
132. But see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). When the NCAA sought to pass a
salary cap in the 1990s, it was blocked by the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 1012–13, 1024. A limited antitrust
exemption could rectify this ruling, which allows coaches to earn millions of dollars while their players
are classified as amateurs.
133. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 369 (observing, “If the NCAA cannot resolve the
problems presented by its regulation of student-athletes internally, and if the courts do not adequately
address the problem, perhaps Congress will be the last resort”); Mitten & Ross, supra note 11, at 877
(discussing how “[a] federal regulatory commission [c]ould have the necessary authority to establish
rules that [would] effectively prevent intercollegiate athletics from crossing the line between a
commercial/education model and a commercial/professional model for intercollegiate sports, enhance
the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics, [and] promote more competitive balance in
intercollegiate sports competition.”); Christopher M. Parent, Forward Progress? An Analysis of
Whether Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 226, 234–36 (2004) (discussing
possible legislative approaches). But see Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 369 (arguing, “The political
cross-currents that so often accompany the legislative process suggest that the viability or desirability
of this alternative might be criticized severely”).
134. See National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act, H.R. 2731, 114th Cong. (2015).
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a ban on institutional stipends to student-athletes, and formal hearings prior to
any NCAA punishment.135 The proposed bill also calls for the establishment of
a Presidential Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, which would be tasked
to review, analyze, and report to the President and Congress.136
Some congressional members sought to limit regulation to only the richest
athletic departments. For instance, on November 20, 2013, Representative
Tony Cárdenas (D. Cal.) introduced the Collegiate Student Athlete Protection
Act.137 This bill seeks to mandate student-athlete benefits, such as five-year
athletic scholarships for those student-athletes in good academic standing,
concussion testing, and the full coverage of costs associated with injury or
illness.138 The catch to Congressman Cárdenas’s bill is that it would only apply
to athletic departments generating $10 million or more in revenue.139
Not surprisingly, both of these important pieces of potential legislation
were stalled since they were referred to committee. The last major action on
the proposed Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act came on November 20,
2013, when it was referred to the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce.140 The National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act has also
been sitting in the House Committee on Education and the Workforce since
June 11, 2015.141 Nevertheless, Representatives Dent and Cárdenas formed a
bipartisan caucus on the topic of student-athlete well-being.142 They hope that
their bipartisan caucus will inform other members of Congress about the
myriad issues facing intercollegiate athletics and help to move forward
proposed legislation.143
V. CONCLUSION
American intercollegiate athletics today are in a state of crisis. Our long
history and revered traditions of amateurism, academics, and fair play are in
jeopardy, and the future of intercollegiate athletics and the protection and
nurturing of its revered history and traditions are uncertain at best. The ongoing

135. Id. § 2.
136. Id. § 3.
137. See Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act, H.R. 3545, 113th Cong. (2013).
138. Id. § 2.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. H.R. 2731.
142. Press Release, Congressman Tony Cárdenas & Congressman Charles W. Dent, Cárdenas,
Dent Form Bipartisan Student-Athlete Caucus (Aug. 7, 2014), http://cardenas.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/c-rdenas-dent-form-bipartisan-student-athlete-caucus.
143. Id.
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spate of antitrust and employment law cases being pursued against the NCAA
is not the best way to balance the complex and conflicting array of social,
moral, and economic values and objectives at stake.
We believe that it is time for Congress to get seriously involved in helping
to guide and chart the future of American intercollegiate athletics. The ideas
set forth in the currently proposed Collegiate Student Athletic Protection Act
and the National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act can serve as a sound
starting point for meaningful analysis and discussion. We believe that
legislation resulting from such a discourse can best serve the economic interests
of our collegiate educational institutions and the multi-billion dollar
entertainment industry while also protecting our revered history of amateurism,
academics, and fair play in intercollegiate athletics, as well as the interests of
our student-athletes.
We do not pretend to know how to set up a perfect intercollegiate athletics
regulatory program that will help sustain the revered traditions and history of
American intercollegiate athletics. However, we firmly believe that the
democratic process is preferable to ongoing judicial decision-making to address
the growing crisis in intercollegiate athletics. Our message to Congress is
simple: It is time to get off the sidelines and play ball!

